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JUL 6 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Personnel Office

1. This is in reply to your EYES ONLY memorandum, subject as above, dated 1 July 1953. In order to obtain data for your survey, I have taken the liberty of discussing your memorandum with two members of my organization who are most closely associated with the services furnished us by the Personnel Office [REDACTED] listed in paragraph 2 below). They have been instructed to comply with the "EYES ONLY" intent of your memorandum. The following information is intended for your exclusive personal use.

2. The personnel listed below are concerned principally with handling personnel matters in this office per paragraph 2 of your memorandum:

[REDACTED]

Executive GS-15
Administrative Officer, GS-12
Administrative Officer, GS-11
Personnel Officer, GS-9
Clerk, GS-5
Clerk/typing, GS-4

3. In a large measure the service furnished OSI by the Personnel Office has been unsatisfactory. It would be unfair to make this generalization without recognizing many of the difficulties as growing pains, and pointing out that in recent months the Personnel Office has designated a very able member of their organization [REDACTED] to handle our personnel matters for them. Under this arrangement, close liaison is being maintained and routine and "crash" administrative matters are being handled very effectively. However, Mr. [REDACTED] apparently has not been in a position to have effective action taken on some of the deficiencies in personnel matters that require resolution at the policy level in his organization. It is noteworthy that he is practically the only link between the Personnel Office and OSI.

4. Placement--The entire placement process has failed this office in many ways:

a. Clerical--From an operating standpoint, OSI has been seriously handicapped because of a shortage of clerical personnel. During the past year the office has never had more than 70 clerical employees, while the T/O calls for [REDACTED] Under this arrangement, many intelligence analysts are forced to spend a large portion of their time on clerical work, and this office has never been able to adequately support the abstract system essential to the effective recovery of information from OCD files.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 29/06/81 REVIEWER: 018995

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(1) There is a wide gap between the clerical recruiters and the operating office.

(2) The policy of not permitting the operating office to interview clerical applicants (at least to stimulate their job interest) is unsound.

(3) The lack of knowledge of the Agency's plans, policies and prospects of success in clerical recruiting prevents the office from knowing how to deal with its clerical situation. The office is forced to assign clericals on a "put out the fire" basis and poor placement results in many instances.

(4) Many clerical applicants are apparently oversold on foreign employment opportunities that do not exist once they are cleared, and others with college degrees have been recruited for work as clerk-typists without being told this is the type of work for which they are scheduled.

(5) There have been instances when the Agency has apparently turned away clerical applicants who are senior GS-5's and GS-6's with government experience because their placement would retard advancement opportunities for people "on board." This would hold true in this office if OSI had [redacted] clericals on board, but not as long as the office is operating with between 60 and 70 on board.

b. Professional--There are several key scientific (physics and medicine) positions in OSI which have remained unfilled for over three years.

c. Recruitment Planning--There is a lack of short and long-range recruitment planning and a lack of coordination in any facet of this planning with this operating office. This office is only called upon by the Personnel Office to brief recruiters and recruiting-consultants, and to submit recruitment requests. We are left to our own devices to develop recruitment arrangements with OSI consultants, with DD/I's recruitment against key vacancies, and with OO field offices.

d. JOT Program--There is a lack of coordination between Personnel, Training and the operating office in the JOT program, and a lack of understanding at the supervisory level of this program.

e. Applicant Screening--Several mediocre professional applicants have been hired by this office because of a failure in the screening process. There are certain job qualifications or

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deficiencies that cannot be detected by a security check, interviews and testing; but are brought to light only by an employment reference check normally conducted by a personnel staff through approaches to other personnel representatives and, in turn, former supervisors. (It is believed the proposed establishment of a Professional Selection Panel will not overcome this specific deficiency.)

f. Coordination--There is an apparent lack of coordination between Personnel and I&SO which produces undue delays in getting people on the job. For example, OSI recently had to hold an Agency-cleared, on duty employee in "limbo" three weeks pending special clearance. A check through OCI revealed the delay had resulted from the fact I&SO did not know the employee was on board.

g. Applicant Relations--This office has lost many outstanding applicants because of the remote, impersonal treatment akin to nearly all phases of their processing. A coordinated arrangement is needed whereby the Personnel Officer and the prospective supervisor (or his staff element) both demonstrate continued interest in an applicant's processing (in lieu of 90-day form letters).

5. Promotion--This office has been handicapped by the lack of an adequate promotion policy upon which to establish equitable promotion practices. A recent check with other operating offices in the DD/I area indicated one office required six months in grade for promotion to GS-14, another 36 months, while another had a minimum age guide.

6. There is an apparent lack of communication between the Personnel Office and the operating offices that results in a lack of guidance, follow-up, and reporting on elements of the Agency personnel programs. The role of OSI is largely limited to commenting on draft regulations, and there is a feeling among those in the office concerned principally with personnel administration that they are operating in a vacuum.

7. The present exit interview procedure ("watered-down" reports) has failed to provide this office with information upon which to strengthen its personnel administration.

8. It is believed this Agency is in a unique position at this point in its growth to develop the confidence of its employees in CIA as a good place to work...to build esprit de corps. The large number of disgruntled, former employees in the Washington area is an indication of its failure in this respect.


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